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Abstract 
Shamir proposed the concept of the ID-based cryptosystem (IBC) in 1984. Instead of generating 
and publishing a public key for each user, the ID-based scheme permits each user to choose his name or 
network address as his public key. This is advantageous to public-key cryptosystems because the public-
key verification is so easy and direct. In such a way, a large public key file is not required. Since new 
cryptographic schemes always face security challenges and many integer factorization problem and 
discrete logarithm based cryptographic systems have been deployed, therefore, the purpose of this paper 
is to design practical IBC using hybrid mode problems factoring and discrete logarithm. We consider the 
security against a conspiracy of some entities in the proposed system and show the possibility of 
establishing a more secure system. 
  
Keywords: Cryptography, Public key Cryptosystem (PKC), ID-based Cryptosystem (IBC), Discrete 
Logarithm (DL) and Integer Factorization (IF) 
  
 
1. Introduction 
Rapid advances in computer technology and the development of the Internet are 
changing the way, we conduct our daily and business lives. Secrecy is an important issue with 
respect to sensitive data transferred over insecure public channels. In an open network 
environment, secret session key needs to be shared between two users before it establishes a 
secret communication [1-3]. While the number of users in the network is increasing, key 
distribution will become a serious problem. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [4] introduced the 
concept of the public key distribution system (PKDS). In the PKDS, each user needs to select a 
secret key and compute a corresponding public key and store in the public directory. The 
common secrete session key, which will be shared between two users can then be determined 
by either user, based on his own secret key and the partner’s public key. Although the PKDS 
provides an elegant way to solve the key distribution problem, the major concern is the 
authentication of the public keys used in the cryptographic algorithm. 
Many attempts have been made to deal with the public key authentication issue. 
Kohnfelder [5] used the RSA digital signature scheme to provide public key certification. His 
system involves two kinds of public key cryptography: one is in modulo p, where p is a large 
prime number; the other is in modulo N, where N = pq, and p and q are large primes [6]. Blom 
[7] proposed a symmetric key generation system (SKGS) based on secret sharing schemes. 
The problems of SKGS however, are the difficulty of choosing a suitable threshold value and the 
requirement of large memory space for storing the secret shadow of each user [8-14]. 
In 1984, Shamir [1] introduced the concept of an IBC. In this system, each user needs 
to visit key authentication center (KAC) and identify himself before joining the network. Once a 
user's identity is accepted, the KAC will provide him with a secret key. In this way, a user needs 
only to know the “identity” of his communication partner and the public key of the KAC, together 
with his secret key, to communicate with others [15-20]. There is no public file required in this 
system. However, Shamir did not succeed in constructing an IBC, but only in constructing an 
IBS scheme [21-22]. Since then, much research has been devoted, especially in Japan, to 
various kinds of IBC schemes. Okamoto et al. [6] proposed an identity-based key distribution 
system in 1988, and later, Ohta [10] extended their scheme for user identification. These 
schemes use the RSA public key cryptosystem [14] for operations in modular N, where N is a 
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product of two large primes, and the security of these schemes is based on the computational 
difficulty of factoring this large composite number N. Tsujii and Itoh [2] have also proposed an 
IBC based on the discrete log with single discrete exponent which uses the ElGamal public key 
cryptosystem.  
In 1991, Maurer and Yacobi [23] developed a non-interactive ID-based public-key 
distribution system. In their scheme, the public keys are self-authenticated and require no 
further authentication by certificates. However, some problems with this scheme were found, the 
scheme was modified and the final version was presented [24]. In 1998, Tseng and Jan [25] 
improved the scheme proposed by Maurer and Yacobi, and provided a non-interactive ID-based 
public-key distribution system with multi-objectives such as an ID-based signature scheme, an 
identification scheme, and a conference key distribution system. In their scheme, the 
computational complexity of the system is heavy. Therefore, it is necessary to have a powerful 
computational capability. Harn [13] proposed public key cryptosystem design based on factoring 
and discrete logarithm whose security is based factoring and discrete logarithm. In 2001, Boneh 
and Franklin, Cocks [26] used a variant of integer factorization to construct his ID-based 
encryption scheme. However, the scheme is inefficient in that a plain-text message is encrypted 
bit-by-bit and hence the length of the output ciphertext becomes long. 
In 2004, Lee & Liao [8] design a transformation process that can transfer all of the 
discrete logarithm based cryptosystems into the ID-based systems rather than reinvent a new 
system. After 2004 several IBC [9, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27] have been proposed. But in these 
schemes, the public key of each entity is not only an identity, but also some random number 
selected either by the entity or by the trusted authority. In 2009, Bellare et al. [11] provides 
security proof or attacks for a large number of ID-based identification and signature schemes. 
Underlying these is a framework that on the one hand helps explain how these schemes are 
derived and on the other hand enables modular security analyses, thereby helping to 
understand, simplify, and unify previous work. In 2010, Meshram [16] has also proposed 
cryptosystem based on double generalized discrete logarithm problem whose security is based 
on double generalized discrete logarithm problem with distinct discrete exponents in the 
multiplicative group of finite fields. After some time Meshram presented the modification of IBC 
based on the double discrete logarithm problem [17, 18, 28-30] and also proposed an Identity 
based beta cryptosystem, whose security is based on generalized discrete logarithm problem 
and integer factorization problem [31] 
Based on the observation that new cryptographic schemes always face security 
challenges and confidentiality concerns and many integer factorization & discrete logarithm-
based cryptographic systems have been deployed. The major contribution of our scheme is the 
key generation phase, which is just a simple transformation process with low computational 
complexity. No modification of the original design of the discrete logarithm and integer 
factorization based cryptosystems is necessary [32]. Therefore, the new scheme has the same 
security as the original one, and retains all of the advantages of the ID-based system.  
In this paper, we design IBC for discrete logarithm problem with distinct discrete 
exponent and integer factorization (the basic idea of the proposed system comes on the public 
key cryptosystem based on discrete logarithm problem and integer factorization) because we 
face the problem of solving integer factorization and distinct discrete logarithm simultaneously in 
the multiplicative group of finite fields as compared to the other public key cryptosystem, where 
we face the difficulty of solving simultaneously the integer factoring and discrete logarithm 
problem in the common group. Here we describe further considerations such as the security of 
the system, the identification for senders. etc. our scheme does not  require any interactive 
preliminary communications in each message transmission and any assumption except the 
intractability of the discrete logarithm problem and integer factorization problem.(this assumption 
seems to be quite reasonable) Thus the proposed scheme is a concrete example of an IBC 
which satisfies Shamir’s original concept [1] in a strict sense. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presented proposed 
public key encryption based on factoring and discrete log. Section 3 given supporting example 
for the scheme. Section 4 explains consistency of the algorithm. Section 5 describes 
implementation of the IBC. Section 6 describes system initialization parameters. Section 7 
describes protocol of the proposed IBC. Section 8 discussed security of the IBC. Conclusion is 
given in the final section. 
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2. The public Key Encryption Based on Factoring and Discrete Log 
 
2.1 Some Notations and Parameters:  
Throughout the paper, we use the following notations and parameters:  
 Two large strong random primes [14] ݌ and ݍ which are safe primes and set the modulus 
ܰ ൌ ݌ ∗ ݍ . 
 A function	߮ሺܰሻ ൌ ሺ݌ െ 1ሻሺݍ െ 1ሻ is a phi-Euler function and ݃ܿ݀	ሺܽ, ܾሻ is the greatest 
common divisor of ܽ and ܾ 
 ݃ is a primitive element in ܼே∗ ൌ ሼݖ, gcdሺݖ, ܰሻ ൌ 1ሽ with order ܰ satisfying ݃ேିଵ ≡ 1ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ. 
 ݄ሺ. ሻ is a cryptographic hash function [32] whose output is a t-bit length and we assume here 
that ݐ	 ൌ 	128. 
 
2.2 Materials and Methods 
We present a public key cryptosystem based on hybrid-mode problems; factoring and 
discrete logarithms. The scheme is described in three phase’s namely key generation, 
encryption and decryption. In key generation phase, the public and secret keys of users are 
calculated. Once computed, the public keys will be published in public directory so that anyone 
including the adversaries could access it while the secret keys remain secret except the owners. 
In encryption phase, the original message that to be sent is first hashed using the appropriate 
cryptographic hash function ݄ሺ. ሻ. This function determines a fixed length of output by hashing 
any arbitrarily length of input. Then a sender gets his hashed message encrypted. This is done 
by using the receiver’s public key and sender’s commitment of secret number. The encrypted 
message is then sent to the legal receiver. In decryption phase, the receiver recovers the 
original message by using his own secret keys and without these secret keys no one can read 
the original message. 
 
2.3 Key Generation 
1. Pick randomly two integers ݁, ݔ	 ൏ 	ܰ from ܼே∗  such that ݃ܿ݀ሺ݁, ܰሻ 	ൌ 	1 
2. Use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute the unique integer	݀,	1 ൑ ݀ ൑ ߮ሺܰሻ such 
that	݁݀ ≡ 1	ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ. 
3. Compute the number	ݕ	 ≡ ݃௫	݉݋݀	ܰ. 
 
The public key is formed by ሺ݁, ݕሻ and can be accessed in the public directory and the secret 
keys is given by ሺ݀, ݔሻ and only known to the legal receiver. 
 
2.4 Encryption 
The sender encrypts his message ݄ሺ݉ሻ as follows: 
1. Select at random an integer ܿ ൏ ݊ from ܼே∗  
2. Get the original message hashed and assume that the resultant becomes ݄ሺ݉ሻ 
3. Calculate the number: 
 
ܥଵ ≡ ݃௖ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
 
4. Disguise the message by computing ܥଶ ≡ ሺ݄ሺ݉ሻݕି௖ሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
 
In the original ElGamal cryptosystem [3], we compute the cipher text  ܥଶ in point (3) without the 
exponent ݁. In our scheme, we need this exponent to disguise our message ‘twice’ and to 
realize the hybrid-mode problems-based cryptosystem. 
 
2.5 Decryption 
The receiver decrypts the obtained encrypted message ሺܥଵ, ܥଶሻ as below: 
Compute the following: 
 
ܥଶௗܥଵ௫ ≡ ݄ሺ݉ሻሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ        (A) 
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3. Example 
For purpose of validation, we illustrate an example to show the basic principle of our 
developed cryptosystem. Practitioners are not recommended to choose keys or parameters 
computed in this example in practice since inappropriate parameters would make this scheme 
vulnerable to attacks. 
Assume that ݌	 ൌ 	29, ݍ	 ൌ 	43. Then the modulus and its Euler-function are now given 
by ܰ ൌ 	1247 and ߮ሺܰሻ 	ൌ 	1176. Next chooses the number ݁	 ൌ 	11, ݔ	 ൌ 	19 and ݃	 ൌ 	17. Thus 
our public and secret keys of the scheme are ሺ11, 1143ሻ and ሺ107, 19ሻ respectively. To encrypt 
the message ݄ሺ݉ሻ 	ൌ 	1122, the sender selects ܿ	 ൌ 	3 and computes and sends receiver: 
        
ܥଵ ≡ 17ଷሺ݉݋݀	1247ሻ ൌ 1172 and ܥଶ ≡ ሺ1122 ൈ 1143ିଷሻଵଵሺ݉݋݀	1247ሻ ൌ 322 
    
The receiver recovers the original message as below: 
 
ܥଶௗܥଵ௫ ≡ ሺ	322ଵ଴଻ ൈ 1172ଵଽ	ሻሺ݉݋݀	1247ሻ ൌ 1122 
 
 
4. Consistency of the Algorithm 
Theorem 1: If the algorithms of key generation and encryption run smoothly then the decryption 
of the encrypted message in decryption is correct. 
 
Prof: The Eq. (A) above is true for all encrypted message ሺܥଵ, ܥଶሻ  since: 
 
ܥଶௗܥଵ௫ ≡ ሾሺ݄ሺ݉ሻݕି௖ሻ௘ሿௗሺ݃௖ሻ௫	ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 				≡ ሺ݄ሺ݉ሻݕି௖ሻሺ݃௖௫ሻ	ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
						≡ ሺ݄ሺ݉ሻ݃ି௖௫ሻሺ݃௖௫ሻ	ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
≡ ݄ሺ݉ሻሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
 
 
5. Implementation of the IBC 
 
5.1. Preparation for the center and each entity 
Step 1.  Each entity generates a k-dimensional binary vector for his ID. We denote entity ݅’ݏ ID 
by ID௜ as follows: 
 
	ID௜ ൌ ሺݔ௜ଵ,ݔ௜ଶ, ݔ௜ଷ, ݔ௜ସ, ……… . , ݔ௜௞ሻ	, ݔ௜௝ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ	, ሺ1 ൑ ݆ ൑ ݇ሻ   (1) 
 
Each entity registers his ID with the center, and the center stores it in a public file. 
 
Step 2.: The center generates two random prime numbers ݌ and ݍ ,compute 
 
ܰ ൌ ݌ݍ          (2)                                     
 
Then the center chooses an arbitrary random number 	݁,	1 ൑ ݁ ൑ ߮ሺܰሻ such that gcd 
൫݁, ߮ሺܰሻ൯ ൌ 1 where ߮ሺܰሻ ൌ ሺ݌ െ 1ሻሺݍ െ 1ሻ is the Euler function of ܰ, then the center 
publishes	ሺ݁, ܰሻ as the public key. Any entity can compute the entity i’s extended  ID ,	EID௜by the 
following: 
 
	EID௜ ൌ ሺID௜ሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ  =	ሺݕ௜ଵ,ݕ௜ଶ, ݕ௜ଷ, ݕ௜ସ, ……… . , ݕ௜௧ሻ	, ݕ௜௝ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ	,  ሺ1 ൑ ݆ ൑ ݐሻ (3) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 where  ݐ ൌ |ܰ| is the number of bits of ܰ. 
 
Step 3. Center‘s secrete information: The center chooses an arbitrary large prime ݌ and ݍ  
computes ܰ ൌ ݌ݍ and also generate n-dimensional vector Ԧܽ over  ܼఝሺேሻ∗  which satisfies 
 
Ԧܽ ൌ ሺܽଵ, ܽଶ, ܽଷ, …… , ܽ௡ሻ		,       1 ൑ ܽ௜ ൑ ߮ሺܰሻ, 		ሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ሻ    (4)                                     																										 
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ܽܫ ് ܽܬ	൫݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻ൯		, ܫ ് ܬ       (5) 
 
where ܫ and ܬ	are n-dimensional binary vector and stores it as the centers secret information. 
The condition of equation (5) is necessary to avoid the accidental coincidence of some entities 
secrete keys. A simple way to generate the vector 	 Ԧܽ	 is to use the Merkle and Hellman scheme 
[12]. 
The center chooses a super-increasing sequences corresponding to ܽ as ܽ௜ᇱ	ሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ሻ		 
satisfies  
                                            
∑ ܽ௜ᇱଵஸ௜ஸ௡ ൏ ߮ሺܰሻ        (6) 
 
Step 4: The center also chooses ݓ such that gcdሺݓ, ߮ሺܰሻሻ ൌ 1 , and computes n-dimensional 
vector Ԧܽ as follows 
 
ܽ௜ ൌ ܽ௜ᇱݓሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ሻ       (7) 
 
where   
 
Ԧܽ ൌ ሺܽଵ, ܽଶ, ܽଷ, … , ܽ௡ሻ        (8)  
 
Remark 1: It is clear that the vector Ԧܽ defined by Eq. (8) satisfies the Eqs. (4)-(5) the above 
scheme is one method of generating ݊ vectors Ԧܽ  satisfies Eqs. (4)-(5). However, another 
method might be possible. 
 
Step 5: The center also chooses a unique integer	݀, ሺ1 ൑ ݀ ൑ ߮ሺܰሻሻ such that	 
 
݁݀ ≡ 1	ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ        (9) 
 
Step 6: Center public information: The center chooses an arbitrary generator ݃ of  ܼఝሺேሻ∗  and 
computes n-dimensional vector ݄ using generator ݃ corresponding to the vector. 
 
݄ ൌ ሺ݄ଵ, ݄ଶ, ݄ଷ, …… , ݄௡ሻ         (10) 
 
݄௜ ൌ ݃௔೔݉݋݀	ܰ ሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ሻ       (11)  
 
The center informs each entity ሺܰ, ݁, ݃, ݄ሻ as public information. 
 
Step 7: Each entity secrete key: Entity ݅′ݏ secrete keys	ݏ௜ 	is computed by inner product of 	ܽ 
(the centre’s secret information) and EID௜ (entity ݅′ݏ extended ID, see Eq.3) 
 
ݏ௜ ൌ ܽ	EID௜ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ 
    =	∑ ௝ܽݕ௜௝ଵஸ௝ஸ௡ ݉݋݀	ሺ߮ሺܰሻሻ       (12) 
 
 
6. System Initialization Parameters 
 
6.1    Center Secrete information 
    ܽ : n -dimensional vector,		݀ - is an integer {see Eqs. (8)-(9)} 
 
6.2   Center public information 
    ݄ : n -dimensional vector see Eqs. (10-11)} ,	ܰ: large prime numbers, ݁: random integers , ݃ : 
generator of ܼఝሺேሻ∗ . 
 
6.3 Entity ࢏′࢙ secretes keys	∶ ሺ	ݏ௜ ሻ  {see Eq. (12)} 
 
6.4 Entity ࢏′࢙  public information: ID௜ is a ݇ െdimensional vector {see Eq. (1)} 
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7. Protocol of the Proposed IBC 
Without loss of generality, we suppose that entity 2 sends message  ܯ to entity 1. 
 
7.1 Encryption  
Entity 2 generates		EIDଵ (entity 1′ݏ extended ID, see Eq.3) from	IDଵ. It then computes ߛଵ	 from 
corresponding public information ݄ and EIDଵ : 
 
				ߛଵ ൌ ෑ ݄௜௬భ೔ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ
ଵஸ௜ஸ௡
 
ൌ ෑ ሺ݃௔೔ሻ௬భ೔ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ
ଵஸ௜ஸ௡
 
ൌ ݃∑ ௔೔௬భ೔భರ೔ರ೙ ௠௢ௗ	൫ఝሺேሻ൯ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 					
ൌ ݃௦భሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ        (13) 
 
Entity 2 will use ߛଵ in our propose scheme. Let ݄ሺ݉ሻ be a message to be transmitted. Entity 2 is 
select a random integer ݎ ൏ ܰ	 and computes the cipher text ܥ as follows  
 
ܥ ൌ ሺܥଵ, ܥଶሻ ܥଵ ≡ ݃௥ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ        (14) 
 
ܥଶ ≡ ሺ݄ሺ݉ሻݕି௥ሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ       (15) 
 
 The cipher text is given by  ܥ ൌ ሺܥଵ, ܥଶሻ 
 
7.2 Decryption  
To recover the plaintext ݄ሺ݉ሻ from the cipher text  
Entity 1 does the following:  
Computes  
 
ܥଵ௦భ	ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ≡ 		 ሺ݃௥ሻ௦భ	ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ       (16)                                   
 
Using his secrete key ݏଵ, recovered entity 2’s the message ݄ሺ݉ሻ by Eqs. (13) and (16) to 
computes 
  
൫ܥଵ௦భ	ܥଶௗ൯ ≡ ݃௥௦భሾሺ݄ሺ݉ሻݕି௥ሻ௘ሿௗሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
                                                             ≡ ሺ݄ሺ݉ሻݕି௥ሻ݃௥௦భሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
                                                             ≡ ሺ݄ሺ݉ሻ݃ି௥௦భሻ݃௥௦భሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ   
                                                             ≡ ݄ሺ݉ሻሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
                                                                                                          
8. Security Analysis  
In this section, we shall show six possible attacks by which an attacker may try to take 
down the new encryption scheme. For each attack, we define the attack and give reason why 
this attack could be failed.   
The security of ID-based cryptosystem based on the index problem in the multiplicative 
cyclic group	ܼఝሺேሻ∗ , where ܰ ൌ ݌ݍ (The factorization of N is known only to the center.) where 
߮ሺܰሻ Euler function of	ܰ. In this system Coppersmith showed an attacking method [27] such 
that ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ entities conspiracy can derive the center's secret information. 
 
Attack 1 [27]: The ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ entities ݅	, ሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ ൅ 1ሻ can derive an n-dimensional vector a' over 
	ܼఝሺேሻ∗  which is equivalent (not necessarily identical) to the original center's secret information. 
Proof: When  ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ entities' ݅	, ሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ ൅ 1ሻ conspire, they have the following system of 
linear congruences: 
                     ISSN: 2089-3191 
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ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ ܧܫܦଵܧܫܦଶܧܫܦଷ⋮
ܧܫܦ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍܽଵܽଶܽଷ⋮
ܽ௡ے
ۑۑ
ۑې ൌ
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍ ݏଵݏଶݏଷ⋮
ݏ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑې	ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ      (17)                        
 
Since each EID௜ is an n-dimensional binary vector, there exists an ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ-dimensional vector ܿ 
over the integer ring such that 
 
∑ ܿ௜ܧܫܦ௜ଵஸ௜ஸ௡ାଵ ൌ 0        (18)  
 
Thus we have 
 
∑ ܿ௜ݏ௜ଵஸ௜ஸ௡ାଵ ൌ 0ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ        (19)  
 
And then 
 
∑ ܿ௜ݏ௜ଵஸ௜ஸ௡ାଵ ൌ ܣ	߮ሺܰሻ        (20)  
 
If ് 0 , the ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻentities can have an integer multiple of		߮ሺܰሻ , and they can find out the 
factorization of		ܰ.Then, a similar method with attack 1 is applicable. Hence, the center's secret 
information can be derived by ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ-entities conspiracy. 
Furthermore, Shamir developed a more general attacking method [28] for the modified 
system such that ሺ݊ ൅ 2ሻ entities conspiracy can derive the center's secret information with high 
probability. 
 
Attack 2[28]: The ሺ݊ ൅ 2ሻ entities ݅	, ሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ ൅ 2ሻ can derive the center's secret information ܽ 
with high probability. 
Proof: When  ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ entities  ݅	, ሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ ൅ 1ሻ conspire, they have the following system of 
linear congruence’s defied by Eq.(21) 
 
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ ܧܫܦଵܧܫܦଶܧܫܦଷ⋮
ܧܫܦ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍܽଵܽଶܽଷ⋮
ܽ௡ے
ۑۑ
ۑې ൌ
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍ ݏଵݏଶݏଷ⋮
ݏ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑې	ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ      (21) 
 
=ܦܽሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ        (22)  
 
Assuming that the matrix ܦ includes n linearly independent column vectors over the integer ring, 
there exist some positive integers ܿ௜ ሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ ൅ 1ሻ such that 
 
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ ܧܫܦଵܧܫܦଶܧܫܦଷ⋮
ܧܫܦ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍ ܽଵܽଶܽଷ⋮
ܽ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑې ൌ
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍ ݏଵݏଶݏଷ⋮
ݏ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑې െ
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍ ܿଵܿଶܿଷ⋮
ܿ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑې ߮ሺܰሻ      (23)  
 
Thus, Eq. (23) can be rewritten by the following: 
 
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ ܧܫܦଵܧܫܦଶܧܫܦଷ⋮
ܧܫܦ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ۏ
ێ
ێێ
ۍ ܽଵܽଶܽଷ⋮ܽ
௡െ1ے
ۑ
ۑۑ
ې
ൌ െ
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍ ܿଵܿଶܿଷ⋮
ܿ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑې ߮ሺܰሻ       (24) 
 
ൌ ܦᇱܽᇱ          (25)  
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From the assumption that the matrix ܦ in Eq. (22) includes n linearly independent column 
vectors over the integer ring, it follows that the matrix ܦᇱ is nonsingular over the integer ring 
(i.e., det ሺܦᇱሻ ് 0ሻ with overwhelming probability, and thus, we have ܽᇱ ് ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ. On the 
other hand, we have the following system of linear congruence’s: 
 
 ܦᇱܽᇱ ൌ 0ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ        (26)  
 
If the matrix ܦᇱ is nonsingular over	ܼఝሺேሻ∗ , then  ܽᇱ ൌ ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ , and this contradicts 
the above results. Thus, the matrix ܦᇱ  is singular over	ܼఝሺேሻ∗ ,and we have det ሺܦᇱሻ ൌ
0ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ with high probability. Hence, det ሺܦᇱሻ is divisible by ߮ሺܰሻ with high probability. 
Furthermore, consider the case where the other ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ entities among ሺ݊ ൅ 2ሻ conspire, and 
define the matrix ܦᇱᇱ in a way similar to the above. Then, det ሺܦᇱᇱሻ  is divisible by ߮ሺܰሻ	with high 
probability. Hence, GCD (detሺ	ܦᇱሻ,det ሺܦᇱᇱሻ  ) gives ݁߮ሺܰሻ where e is a small positive integer. By 
the above procedure, we can evaluate	߮ሺܰሻ efficiently. An additional procedure to find the 
center's secret information is completely the same as attack 1. 
 
Attack 3: An attacker wishes to obtain all secrete keys using all information available from the 
system. In this case, attacker needs to solve integer factorization problem and discrete 
logarithm problem simultaneously. The best way to factorize ܰ ൌ ݌ݍ is by using the number field 
sieve method (NFS) [30].but this method is just dependent on the size of modulus	ܰ.It is 
computationally infeasible to factor a 1024-bit integer and to increase the security of our 
scheme; we should select strong primes [14] to avid attacks using special purpose factorization 
algorithms. To maintain the same security level for discrete logarithm problem with double 
distinct discrete exponent, one must uses ܰ ൌ ݌ݍ with ቀ௣ିଵଶ ቁ and ቀ
௤ିଵ
ଶ ቁ  respectively is product 
of two 512-bit primes. 
 
 Attack 4: Assume that the attacker successfully solves the factoring problem so that he knows 
secrete key	݀.Thus he may obtain 
 
	ܥଶௗ ≡ ሺ݄ሺ݉ሻݕି௥ሻ௘ௗሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ ≡ ݄ሺ݉ሻ݃ି௥௦భሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
 
Unfortunately, at this stage he still does not knows secrete ݏ௔ and cannot exact the plaintext  ݄ሺ݉ሻ from the above expression. 
Attack 5: An attacker is able to obtain the secrete integer ݏଵ from	
					
		ߛଵ 	≡ ݃
௦భሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ . He could 
derive the plaintext ݄ሺ݉ሻ if and only if he manages to get ݄ሺ݉ሻݕି௥,but this is impossible since 
he learns nothing about the integer	݀. 
Attack 6: An attacker might try to impersonate entity 	1  by developing some relation between ݓ 
and ݓ, since ߛଵ	
					
ൌ ܻ௪௦భሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ and ߛଵ, 	
					
ൌ ܻ௪
,௦భሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ  by knowing ߛଵ, ݓ,ݓ, the attacker can 
derive  ߛଵ,   as  ߛଵ, 	
					
ൌ ߛଵ
௪షభ௪,ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ without knowing ݏ௜ however trying to obtain ݓ from ݃ is 
equivalent to compute the discrete logarithm problem. 
 
 
9. Enhancement of Security and Processing Cost 
The center's secret information for the original system in Section 7 is derived by n 
entities conspiracy. In this subsection, we consider the practical countermeasure for the 
enhancement of the security of the system. (For simplicity, assume that n = 512 throughout this 
subsection.) The center partitions a 512-dimensional binary vector B into 256 segments, every 
two bits, such as 
 
B ൌ ሺbଵ, bଶ, bଷ, ……bହଵଵ, bହଵଶሻ 
   ൌ ሺsegଵ, segଶ, segଷ, …… segହଵଵ, segହଵଶሻ      (27)  
 
Then, the center defines aሺi; jkሻ	ሺ1 ൑ i ൑ 256; j, k ∈ ሼ0,1ሽሻ appropriately, computes hሺi; jkሻ, ሺ1 ൑
i൑256;j,k∈0,1, 
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hሺi; jkሻ ൌ gୟሺ୧;୨୩ሻሺmod	Nሻ        (28)  
 
for each seg୧, and publishes the table including every hሺi; jkሻ to all entities. Furthermore, the 
center computes each entity's secret key ݏ୩ by 
 
ݏ୩ ൌ ∑ ܽሺ݅;ଵஸ୧ஸଶହ଺ seg୩୧ሻሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ      (29) 
 
Depending on Eq.(12).The entity k's extended identity, EID୩, where EID୩ is partitioned into 256 
segments,every two bits such as ܧܫܦ௞ ൌ ሺseg୩ଵ, seg୩ଶ, seg୩ଷ, …… seg୩ଶହହ, seg୩ଶହ଺ሻ the center 
distributes it to each entity through a highly secure channel.  
 
9.1 Encryption 
Entity 2 computes γଵᇱ  , 
 
	ߛଵᇱ ൌ ∏ hሺi; segଵ୧ሻଵஸ୧ஸଶହ଺ 	ሺmod	Nሻ      (30) 
 
from EIDଵ and the published table. Entity 2 uses γଵᇱ  as 	γଵ	in the original system (in Section 7) to 
encrypt the message ܯ. 
 
9.2 Decryption  
This is exactly the same as in the original system in Section 6. In the original system in 
Section 6, the center's secret information is derived by 512 entities conspiracy, while in the 
above system it is derived by 1024 (= 4 x 256) entities conspiracy. Furthermore, the running 
cost for encryption-key generation in the above system is about half of the original system. 
However, the center's public information in the above system is about twice than the original 
system. Further generalizations, e.g., each  EID୧ is partitioned into 128 segments every four bits, 
etc., are possible.  
 
 
10. Conclusion  
In this present paper an IBC for integer factorization and discrete logarithm in the 
multiplicative group of finite fields. The proposed scheme satisfies Shamir’s original concepts in 
a strict sense, i.e. it does not require any interactive preliminary communications in each data 
transmission and has no assumption that tamper free modules are available. This kind of 
scheme definitely provides a new scheme with a longer and higher level of security than the 
schemes that based on a factoring and discrete logarithm. The proposed scheme also requires 
minimal operations in encryption and decryption algorithms and thus makes it very efficient. 
Based on the fact that re-inventing a new scheme involves many uncertain and unknown 
threats, and integer factorization and discrete logarithm based schemes are widely deployed. 
This solution can be directly deployed in the currently used system with very low cost. 
Therefore, our new scheme is more practical and has the same security as the original integer 
factorization and discrete logarithm based system. 
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